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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the performance of the 
domestic food producing sector in Jamaica. An evaluation of this 
sector's performance is warranted on several grounds. First, Jamaica 
stands out as a country experiencing approximately eight consecutive 
years of negative rates of growth for the national economy from 1972 to 
1980. However the domestic food sector grew at an average annual rate 
of 3.21 percent over the same period. An understanding of the factors 
hehind this growth is called for while the rest of the economy was in a 
downward cycle. Second, this increase in food production occurred 
while, at the same time, agricultural export production declined drama-
tically. In this respect, the agricultural sector's performance is 
unusual in the Latin American setting where most countries promoted 
agricultural exports during the 1970s largely at the expense of domestic 
food production~/ Third, the populist government of Michael Manley 
(1972-80) has claimed that its programs, designed to improve equity and 
efficiency among agricultural producers, were responsible for the 
resulting rapid growth of domestic foodstuffs in Jamaica in the late 
1970s. This analysis is of particular importance in light of a recent 
work suggesting that "equity" motivated policies (i.e. land reform, and 
related rural development schemes) frequently have negative consequences 
for efficiency and output~/ The degree to which the Jamaican case may 
or may not constitute an exception to this rule forms the basis of this 
article. In addressing this issue we a] so illustrate the misconceptions 
and the distortions that frequently accompany a populist food policy 
program. 
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First, we review the overall patterns of growth of the Jamaican 
economy during this period and the major trends of structural change in 
the agricultural sector. We then present and evaluate specific policies 
undertaken by both the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) administration of the 
1960's and the People's National Party (PNP) government of the 1970's. 
These policies were designed to remove perceived structural constraints 
that had allegedly reduced efficiency and brought about inequities among 
domestic food producers. Further, we document and analyze the influence 
of prices and price policies on the supply of domestic foodstuffs. This 
has not been heretofor documented and addressed directly in the Jamaican 
case since policymakers and researchers have generally felt that struc-
tural constraints rather than pricing disincentives conditioned the low 
economic rate of return to domestic food enterprises. Finally, we draw 
out the implications associated with the causal factors behind the 
increases in domestic food production in the 1970s. 
Major Trends in the Jamaican ~gricultural Sector 
Table 1 portrays the growth rates for selected sectors of the 
Jamaican economy from 1962 to 1979. As noted above, the Jamaican eco-
nomy experienced negative real rates of growth over the decade of the 
1970's. These data also show the sharp contrast between the negative 
growth of export agriculture, and positive growth of domestic food crops 
and livestock activities. These contrasts are further supported by data 
from the Jamaican agricultural census. In Table 2, it can be seen that 
since 1961, there has been a marked increase in the number of farmers 
who derive most of their income from domestic crop production. This 
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shift is particularly noticeable among the smaller sized farm holdings. 
Large farmers, 100 acres or more, also moved out of export crop activity 
and into livestock and/or domestic crop enterprises. It should be noted 
that while farmers moved into livestock production in the 1960's, there 
was a decline of livestock enterprises in the 1970's. 
Another important trend can be noted by examining census data on 
the- <>ourc-f' of principal livelihood for ap,ricultural producers. Tt is 
not surprising that farming (full and part-time) provided farms with 
their major source of income. The data in Table 3 appear to support the 
hypothesis that as farm size increases, qo does the share of income 
coming from farm enterprises. More farms rely on farm income on farms 
with more than 5 acres. It is of interest to note that, on the smallest 
size farms, there was an increase from 1968 to 1978 in the number of 
farms who relied more on farming for income than off-farm agricultural 
or non-agricultural employment. The decline in importance of this off-
farm employment iq due, most likely, to the sharp decline of the economy 
in the 1970's. However, it may also be due in part to a relative 
increase in the rate of return to farming, qpecifically domestic food 
production in a recessionary environment in the non-agricultural sector. 
Data on land distribution in Jamaica for the periods 1954, 1961, 
1968, and 1978 are presented in Tables 4 and 5. As can be seen, total 
land in the agricultural sector has declined over time, from approxima-
tely two million acres in 1954 to 1.3 million acres in 1978 (Table 5). 
This has been due to a decline in export production, the more rapid 
growth of urban employment up to 1972, the equally rapid emigration from 
the island during this period and the ~xpansion of bauxite lands onto 
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former agricultural land. Land distribution in Jamaica is also highly 
concentrated. Approximately 3 percent of the farms controlled 60 to 75 
percent of the total land in agriculture over the period 1954-1Q78 
(Tables 4 and 5). Examination of farm-size data reveals that, while 
total acreage in each farm-size category has declined since 1954, the 
remaining land has become more concentrated into larger farm sizes while 
the number of farmers has grown sharply in the smallest sized class. 
This is the typical minifundia-latifundia hi-model distribution disco-
vered in most Latin American settings. For example, farms 100 acres or 
more increased their share of total land from 48 percent in 1954 to 57 
percent in 1978, while farms of less than 5 acres only increased their 
area holdings from 13 percent in 1954 to 16 percent in 1978. This shift 
did not improve equity in land distribution. In 1954, 69 percent of the 
smallest farm class held 13 percent of all land, while in 1978, 82 per-
cent had 16 percent of all land in the agricultural sector. 
Thus, we find that domestic food production increased, while export 
production declined. Further, most of the domestic food producers are 
small farmers with less than 5 acres of land relying primarily on 
farming as a major source of income. Moreover, land distribution has 
become more concentrated among a smaller number of larger farmer 
holdings, reducing equity within the agricultural sector. We now turn 
to an examination of the agricultural policies that have influenced 
these trends. 
Government Agricultural Policies 
Agricultural policies in Jamaica that have been directed at 
increasing output and improving equity among small domestic food 
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producers have been carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The primary emphasis of these policies have been to 
develop rural infrastructure and subsidize farm practices that will help 
modernize Jamaican agriculture. It was expected that this improved 
infrastructure and modernization would lead to increases in output and 
reduce Jamaica's need for food imports, which averaged 19 percent of 
total imports per year over the past 15 years. 
Under the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) government (during 1960-1972) 
three different programs were launched, each lasting 3 to 4 years. 
These efforts distributed subsidies and loans for such improvements in 
infrastructure as water tanks, farm houses, and soil conservation and 
operational subsidies for the use of fertilizer. Jamaican scholars have 
commented that funds from such programs have been misused (i.e. diverted 
for farm household consumption) and that these programs have done little 
to increase farm output~/ This point is further confirmed by examina-
tion of the limited impact of these agricultural subsidy programs among 
the relevant farmer population (Table 6). Assuming a total of 172,000 
farms (i.e. the average number of farms below 25 hectares between the 
1961 and 1968 agricultural censuses), the average percent of farmers 
reached came to 2-10% for the period 1964-1971, the years of the JLP 
government. The total annual program expenditure averaged 6 percent of 
domestic crop GDP. While it is true that domestic food production did 
increase over this period, it is difficult to assign a causal rela-
tionship to these subsidy schemes given their limited impact among pro-
ducers. Comparable data do not exist to fully evaluate the reach of the 
Peoples National Party (PNP) subsidy programs in the 1970's. 
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Subsidies for fertilizer consumption were another commonly used 
means to increase output and productivity. This data is presented in 
Table 7. Since most fertilizers in Jamaica are used for export crops, 
it is not surprising to note that banana and sugar cane enterprises 
received the majority of this subsidy. When the PNP came into power in 
1972, the subsidy was only expected to be directed to farms with less 
than 25 acres with the subsidy equaling one third of the price. Yet the 
average value of the subsidy, if given across the board, would have 
averaged only 11 percent of the price during the JLP administration. 
Given the sharp bias in favor of export crops, it appears that the 
subsidy has done little to improve fertilizer use among domestic crop 
farmers. Further, it is unlikely that any administrative machinery 
existed that could have effectively channeled much of this subsidy to 
the intended small farmer target group. 
PNP Policies to Stimulate Domestic Food Production 
The PNP government (1972-80) was also committed to a policy of food 
self-sufficiency and modernization of agriculture. To help meet this 
policy goal, and at the same time promote a more equitable distribution 
of assets within the agricultural sector, a land distribution program 
was developed. While the maldistribution of land has been cited as an 
important constraint on domestic food production (and documented above 
in Tables 4 and 5), it was urban politicians and political groups, and 
not farmers or landless peasants, that pushed for this program~/ 
The Land Lease Program was designed to divide idle large holdings 
and allow ~all parcels of these holdings to be leased to farmers on 
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long term contracts (up to 49 years in some cases). In addition to 
land, the government provided infrastructure investment and loans. 
Table 8 shows that, from 1973 to 1979, a total of 37,205 tenants were 
placed; 65,909 arable acres were made available for production on land 
lease farms and 234,785 tons of domestic foodcrops were produced on 
these farms. The cost of this program came to $25 million Jamaican 
dollars of which 9 million J. nollars were in the form of loans with 
only 1.6 million J. dollars recovered in repayments. Over the period, 
1973-79, Land Lease production accounted for only 8.2 percent of total 
output. However, in the last two years of the program, Land Lease farms 
increased their share of total domestic food crop output to 10.5 and 
16.9 percent respectively~/ The high rate of default on these loans 
strongly suggests that Land Lease farmers probably felt that such loans 
were grants designed for their use, and not loans that needed to be 
repaid. Moreover, it appears that this program did not increase equity 
within the agricultural sector as land distribution has become more con-
centrated, as previously noted. 
Efforts were also made by the government to establish collective 
food farms. From 1973 to 1976, approximately 10 million Jamaican 
dollars (in 1974 constant Jamaican dollars) was spent on the establish-
ment of food farms, but output was negligible and the effort abandoned. 
From 1977 to 1979, Pioneer Farms replaced the food farms with similar 
disappointing results, but only 1 million J. dollars (in 1974 constant 
J. dollars) was spent on this effort. 
Another major policy to stimulate domestic food crop production was 
the Crop Lien Program. This was the credit scheme of the Emergency 
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Production Plan (EPP) established in 1977. The EPP was designed to 
increase domestic foodstuff production as a substitute for growing food 
imports. These imports were becoming difficult to maintain in the face 
of a worsening balance of payments deficit in the mid 1970s. The 
increased output was to have come from Pioneer farms and from private 
farms whose production would be stimulated by the Crop Lien Credit 
Program. Approximately 44,000 farmers were reached over a three-year 
period 1977-1979, with 80 percent of the farms that were to be reached 
by the program, participating in the first year (Table 9). The rapid 
decline in the number of farmers and loans granted (columns 1 and 2) 
underscores the inability to financially maintain a costly program of 
this nature. In brief this small farmer loan program was quickly trans-
formed into an ad-hoc income transfer program. The arrears rate on 
loans in this program averaged a remarkable 94 percent.l/ Moreover, the 
impact on output was minimal. Production on farms with Crop Lien loans 
accounted for only 5 percent of total output. There is also some 
question as to whether this program could have led to any significant 
increases in agricultural output due to the existing constraints on 
imported inputs which would have been purchased by the loan. Further, 
field interviews undertaken by the authors revealed that a large part of 
the loans of the interviewed crop lien farmers went toward consumption 
it~s» 
Research, Extension and Marketing 
In addition to developing programs to modernize agriculture, both 
the JLP and PNP governments tried to generate productivity increases via 
research. However, neither government undertook investments that would 
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have promoted sustained productivity increases. This is brought out by 
examining the ratio of research expenditures to domestic crop GDP and 
livestock GDP (Table 10) and evidence on crop yields (Table 12). This 
is in contrast to the development schemes of limited impact discussed 
earlier which averaged 3 to 4 times the level of research expenditure. 
Extension expenditure averaged 4 to ~ times research expenditure. This 
finding is consistent with Boyce anrl Evenson, who found that less deve-
loped countries spend relatively more on extension than on research 
activities~/ This may be due to a belief that extension activities are 
a cheap way to increase agricultural output~/ Also, extension activity 
is important in providing services when there is a lack of rural 
infrastructure. Underinvestment in research by both governments may 
also be due to the disincentives associated with the long gestation 
period needed for research breakthroughs. 
Research expenditure has been low for domestic food crops and 
livestock by any standard. However, of equal importance is that the 
limited research findings in the past have not been transmitted to the 
farmer, with the exception of the Jamaican Rope and Red Poll cattle 
breeds. Most domestic crop research results have been cataloged in 
scientific jargon in a technical publication of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Interviews by the authors with Ministry officials and 
extension agents lead one to believe these findings were not translated 
effectively into layman's language for extension use. Furthermore, it 
was discovered that some of the more important crop research results 
have heen irresponsibly filed away and misplaced in Ministry files~/ 
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In light of the above, technological change does not appear to have been 
an important factor behind the increases in domestic foodcrop output. 
Another major constraint frequently cited in the Jamaican context 
is the poor marketing system. To overcome this constraint, the JLP set 
up a domestic food crop marketing board called the Agricultural 
Marketing Corporation (AMC) in 1963. The AMC, however, has never been 
able to fulfill its role as a major marketer of domestic food crops. 
Over the past 15 years, the AMC has marketed an average of only 6 per-
cent of total output (Table 11). Deficits amounting to several million 
J. dollars a year have been incurred and substantial government sub-
sidies have been required to cover the deficit. As can be seen in Table 
11, the subsidies have totaled $32 million J. dollars, approximately 1/3 
of the value of total food crop purchases in 1Q74 constant dollars. 
Clearly, if there is a marketing constraint, it is still in place as the 
AMC has not relaxed it. Currently, a project to improve the island's 
wholesale marketing infrastructure is being undertaken by AID and the 
Ministry of Agriculture. One of the main purposes of this undertaking 
is to improve the poor performance of all (private and public) marketing 
agents in Jamaica, reduce post-harvest losses and increase the marke-
table surplus of farms. 
Government policies designed to reform and modernize domestic food 
production have had little impact on production. Structural constraints 
such as the maldistribution of land, a poor marketing system, and the 
l!iek of appropriate technology have not been overcome by government 
policies designed to relax these constraints. This can be further eva-
luated by analyzing whether increases in food output are the result of 
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supply or demand shifts. A simple test can examine the correlation 
between quantity and price changes. A positive correlation implies a 
demand curve shift and a negative correlation implies a supply curve 
shift. This test was performed both with prices lagged one period and 
un1agged for the years 1971-1979 in Table 12. With prices lagged one 
period, the simple correlation coefficient was 0.744; with prices 
unlagged the correlation coefficient was 0.560. These results, in com-
bination with casual inspection of the observed pattern of association 
between the index of domestic crop prices and domestic crop output 
(columns 4 and 1 of Table 12) strongly suggest that increases in 
domestic prices have generated increases in the rlomestic supply. The 
change between 1977-78 is the only exception, and it is generally 
acknowledged that this year was an unusually good weather year which 
undoubtedly accounts for most of the positive change. In summary 
government policy has done little to modernize and increase efficiency 
among agricultural producers (that is, cause an increase in supply to 
meet increases in demand). Hence it is now appropriate to consider the 
role of prices in influencing domestic food producers. 
The Role of Prices 
a) Food Crop Prices and Imports 
The relative role of price incentives for domestic food crop far-
mers has not been well investigated or considered important by policy-
makers in the Jamaican setting. Output price policies may not always 
dominate performance, but ignoring product prices and their role in 
influencing the rate of ret~rn to agriculture can frequently lead to the 
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failure of government programs designed to reduce structural constraints 
on agricultural production. Recent studies have demonstrated that 
inappropriate price policies can have a serious deleterious impact on 
efficiency and output in the agricultural sector.l1J 
We begin our investigation by analyzing the relationship between 
imported food prices and domestic food prices.12/ Under the assumption 
that Jamaica cannot influence world prices, there should exist a highly 
positive correlation between food import prices and domestic food 
prices. For the period 1970-1979, the simple correlation coefficient 
between food crop farmgate prices and imported food prices is .16, 
implying a very weak relationship. However, after 1974, food imports 
become constrained in Jamaica due to balance of payments pressures and 
foreign exchange controls. Food imports were rationed at controlled 
prices, thus, import prices from 1975 to 1979 do not reflect the true 
scarcity value of food imports. This is also brought out by the fact 
that during 1970-1974 {a less constrained period) the simple correlation 
between domestic and imported food prices is 0.902. This can also be 
seen by a quick inspection of columns 4 and 5 of Table 12. In short, in 
the early 1970's, there was a strong positive relationship between 
domestic farmgate prices and imp,rted food prices. After 1974, food 
imports were constrained and rationed, leading to increases in domestic 
demand and higher domestic food prices as seen in the data in Table 12. 
This relationship is important since an overvalued exchange rate 
(reducing the costs of food imports below their true scarcity value) 
reduced the prices farmers could have received for domestic production 
before 1975. It has been shown that the exchange rate was overvalued 
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between 10 to 20 percent during this period.l3/ This implicit tax has 
not been adequately appreciated by Jamaican analysts discussing food 
policy. These results highlight the use of the exchange rate to miti-
gate cost of living increases in urban areas. This mechanism became a 
convenient means of indirect control of food prices in the early years 
of the Manley administration. 
At the same time explicit retail price controls on selected food 
and dairy products also directly affected the rate of return to Jamaican 
producers. For example, Table 13 illustrates the fact that the real 
prices received by farmers for beef and milk have remained fairly 
constant over the period 1970-1978. Hence, little incentive had been 
given to these farmers to increase output or upgrade their operations. 
Beef prices were decontrolled in 1973. This permitted local supply and 
demand conditions to reemerge allowing farmgate prices to rise 23 per-
cent in 1q73 (column 1, Table 13). This partially compensated producers 
for the lack of any upward adjustment in the previous three years. 
However, at the same time, the government allowed beef imports to 
increase approximately 70 percent in 1973 (column 4, Table 13). This 
action clearly prevented any continuing rise in local beef prices. 
After 1973, substantial increases in beef imports was used as a mecha-
nism to contain domestic beef prices, during the late 1970's, to a level 
well below local supply and demand conditions. The retail prices of 
livestock products have also been depressed and have followed the trend 
of farmgate prices. This pricing policy, which has benefited domestic 
consumers, may be the primary reason why farmers in the 1970's shifted 
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out of livestock operations and into domestic crop and other activities 
as seen earlier in Table 2. 
b) Supply Elasticities 
Having examined important elements conditioning price formation for 
domestic food producers, we can now turn to a formal analysis of the 
relationship between prices and output. This is done by estimating 
supply functions over the period 1971-1979.~ The crop supply func-
tions are of the form: 
Qt = ao + a1 pt-1 + tt, 
where Qi: is the quantity index of a given crop group; Pt-l is the 
farmgate price index deflated by the implicit GDP deflator, lagged one 
year; Et is the error term. For livestock, the supply functions relate 
the quantity of livestock product with the real farmgate price lagged 
one year. 
The results of these supply functions are presented in Table 14. 
The estimated supply functions for domestic food crops are revealing. 
The aggregate food crop output-price relationship (shown in row one) is 
positive, significant and elastic (1.01). The high elasticity of supply 
for domestic food crops as a whole indicates that prices not only are 
necessary but very likely may also constitute a sufficient condition to 
generate large increases in supply. A 10% increase in price would 
induce a 10% increase in output. However, a qualification is in order. 
While the data for the 1970s indicate a promising positive supply 
response, prices, in the long run, may not constitute a sufficient con-
dition for substantial output increases if the increase in output has to 
be accompanied by a corresponding increase in acreage cultivated by 
15 
domestic food crop farmers. Given the highly concentrated distribution 
of land, and the fact that small farmers comprise the majority of 
domestic producers, one wonders how much more land can be acquired or 
rented by these farmers in the rural setting of Jamaica. At the same 
time the absence of any effective efforts to promote more efficient 
small farmer technology in domestic food crop production has meant that 
the land constraint could not be relaxed by a sustained increase in 
yields. Yields in fact have remained stagnant during the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, the data in Table 14 underscores the fact that those 
crop groups that have significant output-price relationships accounted 
for approximately 50 percent of domestic food crop output in 1972. 
These crop groups, consisting of vegetables, legumes, potatoes, and 
other tubers, are mostly grown for commercial purposes. The other major 
crop group is made up of yams, which accounted for 36 percent of 
domestic food crop output in 1972. The price-output relationship for 
this crop group is not significant. The principal reason for this 
result may be that a significant part of yam output is for home consump-
tion, not for the commercial market~ One should make allowances for 
the marketed portion of output, but the data do not permit this. The 
other crop groups accounted for only 14 percent of domestic crop output 
in 1972 with Plantains accounting for half of the "other" category. 
Prices do not seem to play a major role in determining the output of 
these other minor crop groups. 
Supply functions of beef and milk were also estimated (rows 11 and 
12). In these cases the output-price relationships were not signifi-
cant. This is not surprising given the low variation and unchanging 
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pattern of real prices over the decade of the 1970's associated with 
explicit price controls and/or the indirect use of imports to control 
domestic prices discussed earlier. 
The above findings can now be used to evaluate the influences of 
changes in real prices in determining the increases in domestic crop 
output. The real prices of domestic food crops before 1975 were 
depressed by the overvalued exchange rate and liberal food import 
policy. Hence, part of the low growth of this subsector in the early 
1970's can be explained by low product prices. After 1975, real 
farmgate prices were determined by increases in domestic demand which 
could not be satisfied through cheap food imports due to the more strict 
import control regime. These new conditions led to increases in 
domestic food crop prices which in turn led to increases in food crop 
output in the late 1970s, reflecting the price responsiveness of 
domestic crop farmers. 
c) Demand Elasticities 
The previous section confirms the importance of prices in stimu-
lating a positive supply response particularly in a period of increased 
shortages and rationing of imported foodstuffs. However an interesting 
question arises concerning the degree to which domestic urban consumers 
will easily shift their consumption habits from imported foodstuffs to 
local products. Where there is a substitute or near substitute 
available (e.g. beef and dairy products) this is feasible and likely as 
long as the local cost of producing these local supplies is not prohibi-
tive or can be reduced with technological research and investment. 
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Where there are no close substitutes or consumer tastes are sharply dif-
ferent then the role of prices in promoting a shift in consumption 
habits is less certain. This would be the case in shifting urban con-
sumption tastes from consuming imported wheat and other cereal products 
to the consumption of local tropical root crops, legumes, etc. 
This dichotomy reflects the situation in Jamaica where middle class 
urban consumers have developed a taste for imported cereal crops that 
cannot be grown easily in a tropical setting. T.Je examined the rela-
tionship between imports and domestic food output from the demand side. 
This was done by estimating CES demand functions to analyze consumers' 
choices between consuming imported food and domestic food. The demand 
function estimated was derived from a weakly separable utility function. 
Consumers were assumed to maximize utility by first allocating income 
between various groups of commodities and then deciding if the goods in 
these groups should be purchased from imported or domestic sources. The 
general form of the utility function utilized was of the CES family: 
~ltl -P ~2t -e -1/P 
V = [ t\1 e ~ + 02 e XD ] 
16/ The underlying demand function-- then took the form of: 
Where XM is imported food; XD is domestic food; PM is the price of 
imported food; PD is the price of domestic food; FX is foreign exchange 
available for imports; POLITICAL is a dummy variable where it equals 0 
before 1972 and 1 after 1972 to capture the influence of a change in 
economic and food policies between the JLP and PNP governments; TIME is 
tR 
included to capture wht!ther or not there was a C"hange in consuml.'r rre-
ferences over this period; and cr is the elasticity of substitution. 
Equation 2 was estimated over the period 1965-1979 using ordinary 
least squares. For the initial estimation the Durbin-Watson statistic 
(d) was equal to 2.80 which left the results of the test for autocorre-
lation inconclusive. However, using a maximum likelihood technique to 
estimate Equation 2 improved the explanatory power of the model and the 
D W t i ti i 1 2 The result'alZ/ of this estimation - s at s c was approx mate y • 
are as follows: 
F 38.73 
D-W = 2.04 
173.518 - .8001nPM + .607lnFX + .366 POLITICAL 
(25.14)* (.270) (.110) 
- .089 TIME 
(.013) 
The findings suggest the following: 1) the elasticity of substitution, 
cr, is equal to the coefficient on the price variable which is .80. 
Thus, relative price changes have little impact on influencing consumer 
choice of food consumption. Hence, a devaluation which would raise the 
price of imported food would not lead to a large increase in domestic 
food consumption as consumers would not switch to domestic food away 
from imported food. This is somewhat contradictory to the mainstream 
belief that a devaluation would lead to large shifts in consumer demand 
for domestic foodstuffs. 2) The ratio of imported food to domestic food 
is somewhat insensitive to the change in foreign exchange holdings. 
Decreases in foreign exchange do not influence switching by consumers to 
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domestically produced food. 3) The coefficient of TIME is negative 
implying that tastes have changed towards domestic food and away from 
imported food. However this may be more a function of less food imports 
rather than a true switch by consumers. 4) The dummy variable, 
POLITICAL, is significant which suggests that there was a shift in the 
demand function and a change in the policy mix from the JLP to the PNP 
governments. 
These results suggest that urban consumers in Jamaica will not 
change their food consumption habits lightly. Small price changes asso-
ciated with temporary import constraints, devaluations and/or foreign 
exchange rationing will not lead to substantial changes in demand for 
local foodstuffs. However, substantial shortages and rationing can of 
course redirect consumption patterns as the previous evidence of the 
mid-to-late 1970s showed. 
Furthermore if the government is determined to follow a successful 
long run import substitution pattern of food production, effort must he 
made to promote the production of those products (such as rice, dairy 
products and beef) for which there is a strong demand by urban con-
sumers. Otherwise emphasis must be directed more towards export 
earnings to service non-substitutable food import demand. 
Con~lusfons and Implications 
The recent growth of domestic food output appears to have been 
influenced largely by market forces stimulating domestic demand. 
Structural and/or technical change played practically no role in this 
performance. Since 1965, both the JLP and PNP governments have 
undertaken subsidy assistance schemes designed to improve the rural 
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infrastructure for domestic food crop producers. However, these subsidy 
programs have had only a limited impact on output and an equally limited 
distribution among domestic food producers. The PNP's policy of pro-
moting food self-sufficiency in the late 1970's continued this pattern. 
Approximately 57 million Jamaican dollars were spent on collective food 
farms, land redistribution schemes and credit programs. Nevertheless 
these programs had minimal influence on production and the alleged cre-
dit schemes have, in fact, become merely one-shot income transfers to 
those farmers fortunate enough to receive the loans. In short, over the 
past twenty years, government policy has been concerned with programs 
focused on piecemeal and poorly administered efforts at structural 
change while ignoring the potential incentive effect of prevailing 
prices and pricing policy on domestic food producers. 
This lack of concern for creating better pricing incentives, which 
could improve the rate of return to agriculture for all farmers, pro-
bably reflects the government's interest in allocating benefits to 
specific target groups or party members in rural areas. ~atronage in 
the form of input subsidies is a far more attractive political vehicle 
and propaganda tool than policies designed to improve the functioning of 
markets. Moreover, price and exchange rate policies that improve price 
incentives for farmers may, in the short run, increase food prices in 
urban areas. This would have unfavorable political ramifications on 
important urban political constituencies. This is not to suggest that 
price policy favorable to farmers is a panacea for modernization and 
efficiency in agriculture. Clearly, technical change and structural 
reforms are important as well. 
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In particular, structural reforms and/or productivity increases may 
have to be more effectively introduced in the future to relax the land 
c.'onst"r~tlnt facinp, the largl' number of small domestic food produc.'ers. 
Similarly, new food product lines may have to receive technological and 
financial support to more adequately satisfy urban consumer demand than 
does the current line of tropical products. However, the true lesson of 
the last fifteen years is that undue emphasis on piecemeal structural 
reforms and input subsidies accomplishes little in improving the rate of 
return to farming if product pricing incentives are absent or counter-
productive. 
More liberal price and exchange rate policies could have made an 
important contribution towards improving the economic rate of return for 
domestic agricultural producers. However a less controlled market 
environment implies a less interventionist posture. Among other things 
this reduces the relative role of the government in dispensing political 
patronage and in mobilizing political constituencies. This was clearly 
an unattractive option for the populist Manley administration in the 
1970s. State control and/or ownership in key activities was an 
overriding political goal. Emphasizing price incentives for private 
agricultural producers was not consistent with these political objec-
tives. Nevertheless the net result of both the positive and the nega-
tive performance of domestic agriculture during this period was that the 
product pricing milieu (rather than structural reforms or short lived 
unsustainable input subsidy schemes) still prevailed as the dominant 
influence determining production decisions and output. 
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1. Alain de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin 
America, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1982. 
2. G. Edward Schuh, "Approaches to 'Basic Needs' and to 'Equity' that 
Distort Incentives in Agriculture," in T. W. Schultz (ed.) 
Distortions of Agricultural Incentives, Indiana University Press, 
1978. 
3. On these points see Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economic 
Development of Jamaica, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
Kingston, Jamaica, 1972; and Carl Stone, "Political Aspects of 
Postwar Agricultural Policies in Jamaica (1945-1970), Social and 
Economic Studies, Vol. 23, 1974, pp. 145-175. 
4. On this issue see Carl Stone, Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica, 
Transaction Books, New Brunswick, N.J. and London, U.K., 1980. 
5. This data is dependent on the accuracy of the extension agent and 
officials reporting both Land Lease data and general Ministry of 
Agriculture estimates of production. 
6. For a discussion of the distortions in the rural financial markets 
of Jamaica during the 1970s see Douglas H. Graham and Compton 
Bourne, "Agricultural Credit and Rural Progress in Jamaica: A 
Development Dilemma" in Borrowers and Lenders edited by John 
Howell, Overseas Development Institute, London, 1981; for a 
detailed review of the Crop Lien Program see Douglas H. Graham and 
Stephen Pollard, "The Crop Lien Program in Jamaica: Implications 
of a Credit Project Transformed into an Ad-Hoc Income Transfer 
Program," Social and Economic Studies (forthcoming). 
7. This finding among many others came out of a detailed farm level 
survey of Crop Lien Program clients and reported on in "Farm Level 
Survey and Analysis of Selected Clients of the Crop Lien Program in 
St. Catherine, Jamaica," report to Ministry of Agriculture, 
Jamaica, April 1982, by Douglas H. Graham, Stephen Pollard and 
Compton Bourne. 
8. J.K. Boyce and R.E. Evenson, "National and International 
Agricultural Research and Extension Programs," Agricultural 
Development Council, New York, 1975. 
9. Reed Hertford and Andrew Schmitz, "Measuring Economic Returns to 
Agricultural Research," in Resource Allocation and Productivity in 
National and International Agricultural Research, edited by Thomas 
Arndt~ al., University of Minnesota Press, 1977. 
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10. Given these circumstances, c1aAsi.fi<'ntfon of rest'nrch hy crop or 
function, a traditional mt'ltl'lure of rt'HC'ilrr'h output, wns not 
und(>rtaken here. For a review of the current orgunlzatfon nnd 
state of agricultural research in the Caribbean see T.. B. Coke and 
P. I. Gomes, "Critical Analysis of Agricultural Research and 
Development Institutions and Their Activities," Social and 
Economic Studies, Vol. 28, 1979, pp. 97-138. 
11. On this issue see the studies by Lucio G. Reca, Argentina: 
Country Case Study of Agricultural Prices, Taxes and Subsidies, 
World Bank Staff Paper, No. 386, April, 1980; William Cuddihy, 
Agricultural Price Management in Egy£t, World Bank Staff Working 
Paper No. 388, March, 1980; C. r~tsch and G. Brown, Prices, Taxes 
and Subsidies in Pakistan Agriculture, 1960-1976, World Bank Staff 
Paper No. 387, April, 19RO; and Malcolm D. Bale and Ernst Lutz, 
"Price Distortions in Agriculture and Their F.ffects: An 
International Comparison," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 63, 1981, PP• 8-22. 
12. This relationship has been investigated in other countries with 
similar findings as noted for Jamaica (See: T. w. Schultz, "Value 
of u.s. Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped Countries," Journal of 
Farm Economics, Vol. 42, 1960, pp. 1019-1030; Franklin M. Fisher, 
"A Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Food Surplus Disposal on 
Agricultural Production in Recipient Countries," Journal of Farm 
Economics, Vol. 45, 1963, pp. 863-875; and Reed Hertford, -
"Government Price Policies in Colombia," in T. w. Schultz (ed.), 
op. cit.). 
13. On the poor performance of agricultural exports during this period 
and the severe implicit taxation of agricultural exports carried 
out by the government's marketing boards and an overvalued exchange 
rate see Stephen Pollard and Douglas Graham, "Price Policy and 
Agricultural Export Performance in Jamaica," paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association, 
Logan, Utah, 1982. 
14. For a review of supply functions used in LDC settings see Hossein 
Askari and John T. Cummings, Agricultural Supply Response - A 
Survey of the Econometric Evidence. Praeger Publishers, New York, 
1976. 
15. This was found to be the case from field surveys undertaken by the 
authors in St. Elizabeth and St. Catherine parishes in Jamaica. 
+~• the derivation of the underlying demand functions is from R.G. 
Gregory, "United States Imports and Internal Pressure of Demand: 
1948-68," The American Economic Review, Vol. 61, 1971, pp. 28-47. 
We modified this function to account for foreign exchange influen-
ces as well as political interaction between government and 
consumers over this period. 
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17. Data for the domestic price variable Pn was not available over the 
entire time period 1965-79. Hence estimates of ol, 0z, cannot be 
derived. However the expected sign of cr, the coefficient for lMPM, 
is negative and the estimation supported this. 
Table 1. Real Rates of Growth of the Economy, the Nonagricultural Sector, 
the Manufacturing Sector, the Mining Sector and the Agricultural 
Sector in Jamaica, 1961-1979~ 
National Non-Agr. Manufacturing Mining Agr. Export Agr. -Domestic Food Livestock 
Period£/ GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP Croz GDP GDP 
(1) (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) . (8) 7) 
1962-1967 5.44 5.62 6.10 5.77 2.13 1.19 1.56 6.71 
1967-1972 6.28 6.87 4.67 13.30 1.92 -3.14 6.78 0.39 
1972-1979 -1.51 -1.67 -2.67 - 1.05 1.12 -4.20 3.21 1.96 
1961-1979 2.81 3.08 2.28 5.26 1. 70 -2.11 3.54 3.03 
a/ Average annual compounded real rate of growth. 
b/ Based on 5 year moving averages, for beginning and end points for the years indicated in the table. 
Source: Growth rates derived from official national income and product data in National Income and Product, 
Department of Statistics, Government of Jamaica, Kingston, various years. 
Table z. Percentage Distribution of Farms by Main Source 
of Farm Incomes, 1961, 1968) 1978 
-~ 
Ex£ort Cro12s Domestic CroEsl/ Livestock 
Farm Size (acres) 1961 1968 1978 f961 1968 19,8 1961 1968 1978 
0 < 5 52.0 36.3 29.6 44.4 45.1 64.9 3.6 13.4 5.5 
5 < 25 61.5 51.2 43.6 32.1 37.0 50.3 6.4 8.6 6.1 
25 < 100 58.7 45.7 38.4 21.7 27.6 37.6 19.6 22.7 24.0 
1 00 and above 62.3 50.8 41.5 6.8 7.8 21.6 30.9 34.4 36.9 
All Farms 54.7 39.7 32.2 40.4 42.9 61.7 4.9 12.7 6.1 
lf Includes Domestic as well as mixed crops. 
Source: Agricultural Census 1961/62, Tables 12-16, PP• 11-15; Agricultural Census 1968/69, 
VolQ~e III, Table 34, pp. 26-27; Agricultural Census 1978/79. 
Table 3. Percentage Distribution of Single Holder~/ by Principal Livelihood 
Non-Agri. Farmin~/ 
Agricultural 
Em]2lo~ent Em]2loyment Other 
Farm Size (acres) 1968 1978 1968 1978 1968 1978 1968 1978 
0 < 5 63.3 70.0 12.1 4.7 24.5 17.2 0.1 8.1 
5 < 25 86.3 86.0 3.4 2.3 10.2 8.3 0.1 3.4 
2 5 < 100 80.9 78.3 3.3 2.5 15.5 13.0 0.2 6.2 
100 and above 66.2 67.0 3.5 3.6 29.8 22.0 0.4 7.5 
All Farms 68.1 72.7 10.2 4.3 21.5 15.7 0.2 7.3 
ll Single holders comprised 99 percent of all farm owners, but had only 68.6% of all 
acreage in 1968 and 62.2% of all acreage in 1978. 
2/ Includes both full and part-time farming. 
Source: Same as Table 2. 
Table 4. Number of Farms in Jamaica by Size Groups 
for Selected Years 
---------5 Acres 25 Acres 
Total Under to under to under 100 Acres 
Year Number 5 Acres 25 Acres 100 Acres and Over 
1954 198,883 139,043 53,024 '5,603 1,213 
(100%).!/ (69.91) (26.66) (2 .82) (.61) 
1961 158,577 112,626 41,053 3,785 1,113 
( 100%) (71.02) (25.89) (2.39) (.70) 
1968 193,359 151,705 37,607 3,055 992 
(100%) (78.46) (19.45) (1. 58) (.51) 
1978 183,988 150,633 29,839 2,400 1,116 
(100%) (81.87) (16.20) (1. 30) (0.60) 
lJ Percentages are Row Percentages. 
Source: Agricultural Census 1968/69, Volume IA, P• 19, Agricultural 
Census 1978/79. 
Table 5. Total Acreage of Land in the Agricultural Sector 
in Jamaica by Size Groups for Selected Years. 
-- 5 Acres 2S Acres 
Total Under to Under to Under 100 Acres 
Year Acreage 5 Acres 25 Acres 100 Acres and OV'er 
1954 1,914,375/ 249,074 502,924 232' 178 930,195 
( 100%)1:.. (13.01) (26.27) (12.13) (48. 59) 
1961 1,711,430 198,000 389,441 167,607 956,382 
(100%) (11.57) (22.76) (9.79) (55.88) 
1968 1,489,188 229,216 340,757 127,28 792,007 
( 100%) (15.3q) (22.88) (8.54) (5'3.15) 
1978 1,327,045 216,679 255,841 107,216 751,309 
(100%) (16.02) (19.28) (8.08) (56.62) 
--
!f Percentages are Row Percentages 
Source: Agricultural Census 1968/69, Volume IA, P• 20, Agricultural 
Census 1 ~78/79. 
Table 6. Total Expenditure on Major Agricultural Subsidy 
Programs in Jamaica, 1964-1979 
-----y;Ear-E"X'P"endft'Ure'---------per-c-ent of 
Year _____ on ~ubsidies (000$)!/ Farmers Reached 
--
1964 $1,220 1.07 
1965 1,637 2.3 
1966 2,390 5.4 
1967 2,736 5.4 
1968 1,004 4.2 
1969 974 5.3 
1970 1,170 6.5 
1971 1,629 10.8 
1972 1,091 n.a. 
1973 968 n.a. 
1974 1,082 n.a. 
1975 2,253 n.a. 
1976 2,959 n.a 
1977 2,128 n.a. 
1978 1,143 n.a. 
1979 1,737 n.a. 
----- ---------------
1/ 1974 constant dollars source: Unpublished Data, 
- Ministry of Agriculture. 
Table 7. Average Fertilizer Subsidy and Distribution of 
Subsidy in Jamaica, 1967-1979 
--------------- -.Averaiesubsicfyas ______ Percent'-o-rsubsid"y-
Year ---- Percent of _Retail Price t:_o Sug~~~~ 
1967-1972 
1973-1979 
1/ Only 1967-1971 





Source: Unpublished Data, Ministry of Agriculture and Antilles 












Table 8. Jamaican Government Expenditure, Output, Acreage and 
Number of Farmers Placed in the Land Lease Program 
Total Domestic 
Total Total Total Food crops Total Total 
Acres Arable Acres Produced Costs.!/ Loans!/ 
Leased Acres Planted (in Tons) ($) ($) 
24,205 14,256 3,565 714 $ 840,836 $ 462,802 
33,593 17,405 12,330 8,382 2,783,665 985,960 
29,132 17,735 38,907 55,819 6,822,236 2,562,118 
29,132 17,735 38,907 55,819 5,116,485 1,581,044 
24,684 13,243 26,275 31,498 3,983,101 1,788,327 
4,108 2,896 22,033 59,316 2,687,937 1,119,165 
875 374 24,117 79,056 2,653,706 832,371 
116 ~597 65l909 127!227 234,785 24,887,966 9 l_3_3_1_~807 
Source: Unpublished data from the Production Unit, Ministry of Agriculture. 













2/ Annual Data not available for 1975 and 1976; however cumulative program data to date was available in 
- 1977 and 1974 to allow us to derive the approximations for 1975 and 1976. The sum was divided equally 
between the two years. 
Table 9. Jamaican Government Expenditure, Output and Number of Loans 



















TOTAL 43,989 12,736,471 $289 76,351 
% of 
$ Loan Total 





Source: Unpublished data from the Production Unit, Ministry of Agriculture. 
~/ In 1974 constant Jamaican dollars. 
Table 10. Expenditure on Research and Extension on Dqmestic Food 
Crops and Livestock in Jamaica, 1965-19791! 
Panel A. Domestic Food Crops 
Cumulative 
Total Expenditure in 
Fiscal Years Domestic Crop Research 
1964-1972 $J. 7.8 
1973-1979 6.7 
Panel B. Livestock 
Domestic Crop Res. 












Cumulative in Livestock 
Total Expenditure Livestock Res. as Development 
Fiscal Years In Livestock Research % Livestock GDP and Extension 
1964-1972 $J. 4.98 1.69 $J. 14.0 
1973-1979 9.1 2.83 19.2 
--------
ll in (1,000,000) 1974 constant J. dollars 
Domestic Foodcrop 
Extension as % 








Source; Estimates of Government Expenditure, Government of Jamaica, various years. 
Table 11. Value of Purchases, Operating Deficit, and Subsidies Received 




Total Value Total Total Government 







!/ Nominal values for the years 1975-1978 only 




Source: Unpublished Data from the AMC and Estimates of Government Expenditure, Government 
of Jamaica, various years. 
Table 12. Indices of Domestic Food Quantities 
and Prices in Jamaica, 1969-1979 
---- ---------T;([e;-;{---------------------------
Index of Domestic Index of Index of Inrlex of 
Domestic Crop Food Domestic Food Import 
Crop Output Yields Imports Crop Prices Prices 
Year 
__ ill__~---(~----- __ ill_ _________ (~----- (';) 
1969 n.a. n.a. 119.8 n.a. 70.7 
1970 68.4 100.0 90.3 74.0 6R.3 
1971 92.9 108.0 90.1 85.7 89.0 
1972 101.8 105.0 101.8 86.1 76.7 
1973 93.4 108.0 88.8 97.7 89.0 
1974 100.0 109.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1975 100.0 115.0 101.8 104.2 83.8 
1976 99.9 107.0 101.3 101.1 77.8 
1977 122.2 117 .o 79.2 122.3 65.4 
1978 155.1 122.0 107.3 95.7 79.1 
1979 132.8 26.0 n.a. 109.0 103.1 
_ _,...,. ____________________ 
Sources: Indices of Domestic Agricultural Production and Farmgate Price (1g7o-19i'f), Data Bank and Evaluation Division, Ministry of 
Agriculture, .Jamaica, and Statistical Yearbook of Jamaica, 1979, 
Department of Statistics, Jamaica. 
Table 13. Annual Farmgate Prices, Retail Prices, Output and 
Imports of Beef and Milk in Jamaica 1970-1979 
--------- ------ ------------Beef Milk 
Farm Retail Output Impor~ Farm Retail 
Output1/ 
--Imports-
Year Pr iceJ) ,f:_l PriceY ('000 lbs) ('000 lbs) PriceY Price.!/ ( '000 lbs) 
($/lb) (f./ qt) (f./ qt) 
_.Ql_ ____ .J.~ (3) 
--- (4) (5) (6) (7) ___ (8) 
1970 $35.6 1.09 27,400 9,067 23.3 37 n.a. 21 '715 
1971 35.7 1.17 25,775 7,170 21.8 36 42 20,377 
1972 35.1 1.18 27,117 3,350 27.2 39 41 28,013 
1973 43.5 1.38 29,063 9,671 26.5 36 41 14,235 
1974 42.5 1.32 28,128 8,671 25.0 32 43 32,827 
1975 43.4 1.34 31,169 11,058 26.5 32 43 17,529 
1976 41.9 1.28 27,212 11,044 23.7 30 42 27,300 
1977 40.7 1.20 27,233 10,947 21.2 27 41 20,297 
1978 43.4 1.24 25,574 9,493 24.5 29 43 27,401 
1979 47.9 1.56 25,177 17,674 26.0 37 40 24,165 
----
Source: Annual Reports of the Jamaica Livestock Association, various years; Social and 
Economic Surveys, various years; External Trade, various years; and Statistical 
Yearbook ~Jamaica, 1979. 
ll Price is deflated by GDP deflator, base year 1974. 
11 Farmgate Price for beef is per 100 pounds live weight. 
11 Milk output is Ministry of Agriculture estimate. 
Table 14. Estimates of Supply Functions for Selected Domestic 
Food Groups in Jamaica 1971-1979 
--- -------------..,.Sh'""o_r_t__,R_u_n 
__ F_o....;o_d_G_ro_u_.p ______ I_n_t_e_r_ce..;..p,_t __ P_r_i_c_e ____ R:? __ r.las tici ty 










1 0. Other Tubers 
11. Beef 










































































tl Numbers in parentheses for the intercept and price variables are the 
standard errors; for the R2, it is the F-Statistic for the 
regression. 
11 Significant at the 5 percent level. 
